Vigil@nce - GnuTLS: forgery of RSA PKCS #1 signature
March 2015 by Vigil@nce
This bulletin was written by Vigil@nce : http://vigilance.fr/offer
SYNTHESIS OF THE VULNERABILITY
An attacker can for example use MD5 to sign RSA PKCS #1 data of an
application linked to GnuTLS, in order to more easily create a
forged signature.
Impacted products: Debian, Ubuntu, Unix (platform)
Severity: 1/4
Creation date: 24/03/2015
DESCRIPTION OF THE VULNERABILITY
TLS sessions choose a signature algorithm for RSA PKCS #1.
However, GnuTLS does not check if the algorithm used is the same
as the one indicated in the X.509 certificate.
An attacker can therefore for example use MD5 to sign RSA PKCS #1
data of an application linked to GnuTLS, in order to more easily
create a forged signature.
ACCESS TO THE COMPLETE VIGIL@NCE BULLETIN
http://vigilance.fr/vulnerability/GnuTLS-forgery-of-RSA-PKCS-1-signature-16447